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Colin S. G
r
ay 
the 
spring 
of 
2003, 
American 
policy 
makers 
and 
militar
y 
leaders 
did 
not 
expect 
to 
become 
inv
olv
ed 
in 
a 
pr
otracted 
counterinsurgency 
campaign 
in 
I
raq. 
B
ut 
it 
has 
no
w 
become 
the 
seminal 
conict 
of 
the 
curr
ent 
era 
and 
will ser
v
e as a paradigm for futur
e strategic decisions.

1
omas 
R. 
M
ockaitis 
tells 
us 
that 
I
raq 
is 
the 
insurgency 
fr
om 
hell.

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I 
suggest 
that 
for 
all 
r
egular 
soldiers 
all 
insurgencies 
ar
e 
hell-born, 
though 
admittedly 
some 
ar
e 
mor
e 
hellish 
than 
others. 
And 
to 
open 
one 
of 
my 
themes 
just 
a 
crack, 
W
illiam 
T
ecumseh 
S
herman, 
a 
gr
eat 
American 
gen
­
eral, 
once 
said 
that 

war 
is 
hell
 
(actually
, 
those 
exact 
wor
ds 
w
er
e 
cr
edibly 
attributed 
to 
him). 
W
ith 
our 
sophistication 
and 
scholarship
, 
and 
no
w 
our 
doctrine 
mongering, 
it 
is 
necessar
y 
to 
r
emember 
that 
w
e 
ar
e 
talking 
about 
war
, including a fair amount of war
far
e.
I
nsurgency
, 
or 
irr
egular 
war
, 
and 
war
far
e 
ar
e 
global 
phenomena, 
and 
they 
always 
hav
e 
been. 
I 
am 
pr
o
viding 
an 
Anglo-American 
perspectiv
e 
be
­
cause 
that 
is 
what 
I 
am 
and 
kno
w 
best. 
is 
can 
appear 
to 
bias 
an 
analysis 
because 
it 
cannot 
av
oid 
implying 
that 
COIN 
and 
counter
terr
orism 
(CT
), 
and 
especially 
some 
pathologies 
in 
tr
ying 
to 
deal 
with 
them, 
ar
e 
unique 
to 
us. ey ar
e not.
When 
Ralph 
P
eters 
urges 
a 
bloody
, 
attritional 
appr
oach 
on 
one 
of 
his 
mor
e 
color
ful 
days, 
he 
is 
talking 
the 
language 
of 
R
oman 
generalship 
under 
V
espasian 
and 
his 
son 
T
itus 
in 
their 
br
utal 
suppr
ession 
of 
the 
J
e
wish 
R
ev
olt 
in 
P
alestine 
in 
AD 
6677.
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I
rr
egular 
war
far
e 
is 
an 
old, 
old 
stor
y
, 
and 
so 
ar
e 
the 
methods 
applied 
to 
wage 
it, 
on 
both 
sides. 
T
oday

s 
motiv
es 
for 
irr
egu
­
lar 
war
far
esupposedly 
so 
modern, 
ev
en 
postmodernlead 
some 
com
­
mentators 
to 
speculate 
about 

ne
w 
wars
 
as 
contrasted 
with 

old 
wars.

4
 
I
f 
y
ou 
ar
e 
str
ongly 
of 
that 
persuasion, 
the 
best 
I 
can 
do 
is 
to 
suggest 
that 
y
ou 
ponder 
long 
and 
har
d 
on 
ucy
dides 
and 
his 
famous 
and 
o
v
er
quoted 
tripty
ch 
of 

fear
, 
honor
, 
and 
inter
est
 
as 
comprising 
the 
primar
y 
motiv
es 
for 
political 
behavior
, 
including 
war
.
5
 
I
rr
egular 
war
far
e, 
of 
necessity 
in 
common 
with 
its 
ucy
didean 
motiv
es, 
is 
about 
political 
po
w
er: 
who 
gets 
it, 
and 
as 
a 
rather 
secondar
y 
matter
, 
what 
to 
do 
with 
it. 
at 
may 
seem 
a 
banal 
point, but 
r
eally it 
is 
not. 
COIN 
is 
about 
the 
contr
ol 
of 
people 
and 
territor
y
, 
not 
the 
r
emaking 
of 
civilizations, 
or 
ev
en 
cultur
es. 
C
r
usaders 
make bad policy makers; they tend to be disinter
ested in strategy
.
Also, 
speaking 
as 
a 
strategist, 
I 
hav
e 
a 
pr
ofessional 
dislike 
for 
impossible 
missions. 
E
v
en 
if 
I 
do 
the 
wr
ong 
thing, 
I 
like 
to 
think 
that 
I 
can 
succeed. 
W
e 
strategists 
ar
e 
pragmatic 
people, 
and 
w
e 
don

t 
like 
accepting 
long, 
ad
­
v
erse odds in pursuit of benets of highly dubious wor
th.
[ 
36
] 
S
TR
ATEGIC
 
S
TUDIES
 
Q
UAR
TER
L
Y
 
 z
 
W
INTER
 
2007 
